The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

June 2015

Why "Privileges or Immunities"? An Explanation of
the Framers' Intent
William J. Rich

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Rich, William J. (2009) "Why "Privileges or Immunities"? An Explanation of the Framers' Intent," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 42 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Rich: Why "Privileges or Immunities"?

10-RICH.DOC

7/6/2009 12:05 PM

WHY “PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES”? AN
EXPLANATION OF THE FRAMERS’ INTENT
William J. Rich∗

I.
II.
III.
IV.
IV.
V.

Introduction ..................................................................... 1111
Federalism (Not Just the Bill of Rights) .......................... 1112
Congress (Not the Supreme Court) ................................. 1115
Justice Miller Was Not the Enemy .................................. 1118
Contemporary Implications ............................................. 1123
Conclusion ....................................................................... 1126
I. INTRODUCTION

In the Slaughter-House Cases,1 Justice Field accused the majority
of turning the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause2 into a “vain and idle enactment which accomplished nothing,”3
and Justice Swayne argued that the majority “turn[ed] . . . what was
meant for bread into a stone.”4 Most contemporary commentators
appear to agree.5 Robert Bork went so far as to compare that clause to a
provision “written in Sanskrit” or “obliterated past deciphering by an ink

∗ Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. I appreciate assistance from my
colleagues, Jeff Jackson and Bill Merkel, who provided helpful feedback during the preparation of
this article. I am also grateful for the support from Richard Aynes and participants in The
University of Akron’s 14th Amendment Symposium, with particular thanks to David Bogen for his
insight and guidance.
1. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
3. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 (1994)
(noting that “‘everyone’ agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause
. . .”).
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blot.”6 Did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment make a colossal
mistake? Or were Justices Field and Swayne correct when they blamed
Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House for leading the
nation astray? Answers to these questions, in the pages that follow, are
“no” to the first, and a qualified “no” to the second. The phrase
“privileges or immunities” made sense at the time when Congressman
Bingham and his colleagues inserted it into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Contemporary misunderstanding of that clause reflects continuing
failure to appreciate positive aspects of the framework offered by Justice
Miller in 1873.
II. FEDERALISM (NOT JUST THE BILL OF RIGHTS)
In the hundred and forty years following ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, much of the debate has focused upon
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Many commentators argue that the
framers of the Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights
when they drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause.7 Detractors who
argue against incorporation ask, among other things, why the framers did
not simply use that language if their intent was to make states subject to
the Bill of Rights.8 The Supreme Court muddled these issues, rejecting
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for incorporation in the
Slaughter-House Cases9 and then using the Due Process Clause to
accomplish virtually all of the same goals. Because the Supreme Court
used the “wrong clause,” however, academic debate continues
unabated.10
The central thesis of the following discussion is that this debate has
been too narrow; the phrase “privileges or immunities” was chosen
because the framers had more than the Bill of Rights in mind when they
promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment, and incorporation of the Bill of
6. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
166 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1098-1124 (2000).
8. See, e.g., D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4
IOWA L. BULL. 219, 233 (1918).
9. 83 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1873).
10. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
181-230 (1998) (proposing a “refined model of incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (citing historical evidence in support of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to
Michael Curtis’ Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983).
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Rights would only accomplish a portion of their objectives. The framers
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to assure state compliance with
rights derived from federal law in a broad sense. They chose the phrase
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” specifically to
meet this objective.
For an illustration of this point, consider the case of Samuel Hoar.
In 1844, Massachusetts sent Hoar as an emissary to South Carolina to
protest that state’s imprisonment of British and American seamen with
African ancestry who arrived in the port of Charleston.11 The South
Carolina legislature denounced Hoar, claiming the state’s right to
exclude “free negroes and persons of color” who could not be United
States citizens and therefore were not protected by “the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.”12 Hoar hastily retreated,
fearing for his life.13 The Hoar affair became a cause célèbre, with
southern states rallying to the support of South Carolina,14 while the
Massachusetts legislature invoked the need for congressional action to
protect the citizens of that state.15 Rather than dying a quiet death, the
controversy sparked debate in Congress both before and after the Civil
War.16 In his first speech on the floor of Congress supporting what
became the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman John Bingham
decried the lack of safety for a Massachusetts citizen in the streets of
Charleston, and denounced South Carolina for “utterly disregard[ing] . . .
the privileges and immunities” of Samuel Hoar.17
While the reference to Hoar could be characterized as an example
of the need to incorporate the Bill of Rights, protecting the right of all
Americans to exercise freedom of speech and to petition state
governments, that depiction misses a larger point. Hoar traveled to
South Carolina to denounce that state’s defiance of Commerce Clause
and Treaty Clause protection for the right of free navigation.18 He
11. Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, The United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 18221845, 1 J. S. HIST. 3, 22 (1935).
12. 5 STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES
238 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1900) [hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS].
13. See Hamer, supra note 11, at 23.
14. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 237.
15. Hamer, supra note 11, at 23.
16. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 748 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967)
(listing seventeen pages with references to the “Hoar incident in South Carolina” during debates
surrounding promulgation of the Civil War Amendments). This account does not include a number
of implied references to the same events.
17. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866).
18. See Hamer, supra note 11, at 22-23. Supreme Court Justice William Johnson had
previously issued a circuit court opinion stating that South Carolina’s law violated both Commerce
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planned to argue that the South Carolina law conflicted with “the
express provisions or fundamental principles of the national compact.”19
The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause was
drafted for the broad purpose of assuring that individuals would be able
to enforce federal law against state authorities.20
An assessment of congressional debates and subsequent treatment
of these issues leads to identification of three categories of “rights” that
fall within the scope of “privileges or immunities.”21 The first category
includes rights directly defined in the constitutional text and determined
to be applicable to the states. The Bill of Rights as currently
incorporated into the Due Process Clause fits within this definition, and
so do rights found in Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution as
well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV section 2. A
second category involves rights derived from acts of Congress
specifically authorized by the Constitution. This category would include
Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause rights such as those that should
have protected the seamen who entered Charleston Harbor.22 It would
also include patent rights or bankruptcy rights as subsequently defined
by Congress.23 The third category includes those interstitial rights which
may be fairly inferred from the Constitution. The “right to travel,”
recognized by the Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe,24 fits within this
definition; the Supreme Court first identified this right in 1867 with its
decision striking down a capitation tax in Crandall v. State of Nevada.25
and Treaty Clause powers of Congress, but dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See Elkison
v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495-96, 498 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
19. Hamer, supra note 11, at 22. President Andrew Jackson and his Attorney General Roger
Taney had refused to take action against South Carolina, with Taney expressing the view that “[t]he
African race in the United States even when free . . . were not looked upon as citizens by the
contracting parties who formed the Constitution” and were therefore not protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE
DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (1981).
20. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57, 70-73 (1993) (noting John Bingham’s emphasis on federal authority to enforce, “at a
minimum,” the Bill of Rights).
21. See William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
235, 249-82 (2001) (providing a more detailed development of this background).
22. See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 495-96.
23. See An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and
Copyrights, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (July 8, 1870); see William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or
Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 204, 216
(2002).
24. 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).
25. 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867). The right to privacy or personal autonomy arguably may also fit
within this definition, although there is no reason to pursue that controversy within this paper.
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The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment aptly chose the phrase
“privileges or immunities” to reflect this combination of interests.
Although the terms were familiar enough to lawmakers, having already
appeared in the text of the Constitution with respect to rights of state
citizens, their meaning had only been discussed at length in one prior
federal court opinion. In Corfield v. Coryell,26 Justice Bushrod
Washington devoted a page of text to the meaning of the phrase, but did
little to provide clarity beyond holding that it did not prohibit all state
laws according different treatment to citizens and non-citizens.27 He did
include “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety” subject to “such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.”28
Omitted from the framework described above is the argument made
by dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress control over substantive rights that fall
within the scope of state privileges and immunities.29 Congress had
gained authority to enforce the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause when non-residents of a state were discriminated against, but not
to rewrite the laws encompassed by that clause.30 As drafted and as
defended during the ratification debates, the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause only extended federal authority to rights
directly linked, either explicitly or implicitly, to the national
government.31
III. CONGRESS (NOT THE SUPREME COURT)
During the ratification debates, critics of the phrase “privileges or
immunities” voiced concerns that the text swept too broadly and
enlarged federal power without providing clear guidance regarding the

26. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (concluding that a statutory scheme to seize
the boats of non-residents who unlawfully gather oysters was not a violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
27. Id. at 551-52.
28. Id.
29. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 77 (“[W]hatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own
citizens, . . . the same . . . shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction.”).
31. See Rich, supra note 23, at 167-73.
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boundaries of that power.32 Reassurance by advocates of the Fourteenth
Amendment consisted in significant part of expressions that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not expand the substantive scope of
existing protection.33 Some have taken such statements as implied
rejections of incorporation,34 in spite of repeated favorable references to
the Bill of Rights.35 While rejecting those assessments, a more
substantial contemporary concern is that focus upon the Bill of Rights
debate has side-tracked scholars from a primary reason for choosing the
phrase “privileges or immunities.” The framers were more likely to
have been concerned about the role of Congress in defining those rights
that would be enforceable against the states.36
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment began with fears that the
Thirteenth Amendment failed to give Congress adequate authority to
enact early civil rights legislation.37 The framers therefore focused on
expanding that power, and it is reasonable to believe that they foresaw a
predominant role for Congress in defining the scope of the Amendment.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause corresponds to that focus,
especially when judged in light of the broad definition of that phrase
extant at the time. Given that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment

32. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 133 (1866) (Congressman Rogers
challenging the broad extension of federal power represented by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause).
33. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (Congressman Bingham,
assuring that “the proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the Union, or any citizen
of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of
the Constitution”).
34. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 36 (1949) (asking “if Bingham’s object was to make the provisions of
the first eight Amendments applicable to the states, why did he not say so?”).
35. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68 (arguing that references to “privileges” or
“immunities” in years prior to promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment “all were understood to
encompass, among other things, the protections of the federal Bill of Rights”).
36. Contemplation of an active congressional role in defining “privileges or immunities,”
rather than direct judicial enforcement, could also explain the lack of concern about possible
discontinuity between the Bill of Rights and existing state constitutions with respect to issues such
as grand jury indictment. Thus, congressional enforcement power could be seen as a vehicle for
achieving “selective incorporation.” But see Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77-78 (1963) (finding “no evidence . . . that anyone
thought or intended that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation”).
37. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 30 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to “embody and protect” the Civil Rights Act of 1866); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 346-49 (1985) (noting an intent to provide constitutional
authority for enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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were focusing on federalism issues,38 there are good reasons to believe
that members of Congress were chiefly concerned about their own
legislative authority as distinct from the authority of the courts.
Admittedly, the framers were aware of problems associated with
judicial interpretation of constitutional text, especially as visited upon
the nation in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.39 They crafted the
Fourteenth Amendment in part to overrule the racist assumptions upon
which that case was based,40 thereby sending a message to the Supreme
Court to avoid such debacles in the future. “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States” were given citizenship status and
protected from discriminatory treatment.41 But it was emphatically
Congress that was given the “power to enforce” the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.42
Congress accepted that challenge with enactment of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871 (also known as The Civil Rights Act of 1871), which
imposed liability on persons who “under color of any law . . . cause . . .
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States.”43 The purpose of this law was
explained by Congressman Bingham, primary sponsor of the Fourteenth
Amendment, who sought to “provide by law for the better enforcement
of the Constitution and laws of the United States.”44 In 1874, a
Committee on Revision of the Laws, charged with the responsibility to
“amend the imperfections of the original text” without altering
meaning,45 revised language from the Ku Klux Klan Act to develop what
we now find in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protecting “any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the federal
government.46 With this language, Congress communicated the broadly
accepted understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to
be co-extensive with rights found within the text of the Constitution as
well as rights defined by Congress exercising its authority as defined by
Article I of the Constitution. Today, federal statutory rights may be
38. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text.
39. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
40. Both sides of the Slaughter-House debate appear to agree on this point. See SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) (noting the purpose of providing “freedom of the slave race”);
id. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting) (noting reversal from Dred Scott).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
43. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
44. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 81 (1871).
45. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 2, 14 Stat. 74, 75.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
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enforced by invoking § 1983,47 but few appear to remember that
authority for doing so may be traced to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
IV. JUSTICE MILLER WAS NOT THE ENEMY
Few Supreme Court justices have been more savagely attacked than
Justice Samuel Miller,48 and few opinions have been subject to such
prolonged criticism as Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases.49 The criticism looks good in hindsight; subsequent Supreme
Court decisions rejected incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and Slaughter-House opened the door
for those decisions. Casting blame in that manner, however, distracts
from a more charitable view of the Slaughter-House framework which
retains contemporary significance.50
Misunderstanding of Slaughter-House begins with a failure to
appreciate the competing ideologies of the litigants in that case. John A.
Campbell, who represented the plaintiffs, was a former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice who shared responsibility for the Dred Scott decision as a
member of that Court, and who resigned from that office to join the
Confederacy.51 He was also a disciple of John C. Calhoun.52 Attorneys
on the other side of the argument were followers of Daniel Webster, who
had opposed secession and organized an army to support President
Jackson’s battle against nullification.53 After reviewing this alignment
of counsel, some may argue that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were
abandoning their historical ideological commitments by challenging
state authority to regulate the butchers of New Orleans and advocating

47. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980) (explaining that § 1983 “was intended to
provide a remedy to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights”).
48. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 55 (1997) (characterizing Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House as “probably
the worst holding, in its effect on human rights, ever uttered by the Supreme Court”).
49. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
50. For a more favorable view of Justice Miller’s perspective in Slaughter-House, see
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 201-10 (2003) (describing Justice Miller’s
background as a physician, his support for public health measures, and his support for the biracial
government in Louisiana that enacted the Slaughter-House regulations).
51. See id. at 200; Michael Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughter-House
Cases, 18 TUL. L. REV. 1, 88 (1943).
52. Franklin, supra note 51, at 88.
53. Id. at 52.
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national oversight.54 An alternative perspective suggests that Chief
Justice Miller and others in the majority understood that the plaintiffs
were attempting to promote individual property rights, and in that sense
the plaintiffs’ arguments remained in line with their prior commitment to
the owners of slaves.55 Calhoun’s arguments for states’ rights were
based upon an assumption that South Carolina would retain the
institution of slavery, and his conservative ideology had as much to do
with preserving individual property rights as with restraining the
national government.56
Ironically, one of the few cases subjected to as many academic
attacks as Slaughter-House is Lochner v. New York.57 The losing
argument in Slaughter-House eventually prevailed in Lochner.58 Justice
Field’s dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House cited at length to the
views of Adam Smith.59 Justices Bradley and Swayne were equally
devoted to protecting property rights in their broadest form, with Justice
Swayne arguing that “[p]roperty is everything which has an
exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to
dispose of it according to the will of the owner.”60 The opinions of
Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne coincide with those of the Court
majority in 1905, which concluded that freedom of contract principles
should prevail over protective labor legislation.61
In contrast, Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House took a
decidedly cautious approach toward striking down state measures
designed to protect public health. While there are phrases in his opinion
which, with the benefit of hindsight, suggest an unduly limited scope for
the Fourteenth Amendment,62 the basic framework that he described for

54. See, e.g., Aynes, supra note 5, at 657.
55. See Rich, supra note 23, at 179. In contemporary terms, it would be the same as an
expectation that Justice Thomas, who grew up in South Carolina and appears to follow the ideology
of Calhoun and his compatriots, would promote states’ rights over those of the federal government
and would also champion the rights of private property owners over regulatory authority of the
states.
56. Id.
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58. See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising
the Slaughter-House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996).
59. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 n. 39 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing 1
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, ch. 10, part 2.).
60. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
61. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
62. E.g., after describing the “pervading purpose” of the Civil War amendments to the
Constitution, Justice Miller described discrimination against emancipated slaves as the “evil to be
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interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause parallels major
components of the approach described in this article.63 Miller explicitly
refers to both the navigation rights and the interstitial right to freedom of
travel as examples of privileges or immunities.64 He rejected a meaning
that would have incorporated the writings of Adam Smith (or Herbert
Spencer) into the Constitution, and history demonstrates the wisdom of
that response.65 Presumably, for those who pillory Justice Miller’s
opinion while also condemning the Supreme Court decision in
Lochner,66 the Slaughter-House dissenters surely do not offer much in
the way of a positive alternative.67
A primary focus of Justice Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was his effort to dispel belief that new substantive
rights were to be identified and defined by the courts, without having an
independent basis in the Constitution or laws of the United States
government.68 Instead, the Clause protected those rights that “owe their
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws.”69 The first example he gave was the case of
Crandall v. Nevada,70 a case from 1867 in which Justice Miller had
established the right of United States citizens to travel freely from one
state to another.71 The right to travel falls within a more general
category of rights derived from the “national character” of the
government.72
Justice Miller illustrated a second category of protections embodied
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause by reference to the “right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances” and the
“privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” both of which were identified

remedied” by the Equal Protection Clause, doubting whether other actions would “come within the
purview” of that provision. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
63. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
64. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
65. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum
wage law for women, and signaling the demise of Lochner).
66. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, 140, 162
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (with chapters describing SlaughterHouse as “disastrous” and Lochner as a “tragedy”).
67. A more entrenched version of Lochner may have been even more difficult to reverse than
the opinion that Justices Holmes and Harlan so effectively dissented from in 1905.
68. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
transform the Supreme Court into a “perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States”).
69. Id. at 79.
70. 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
71. Id. at 44.
72. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
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as “rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”73 With
this language, Justice Miller incorporated individual rights which the
text of the Constitution identified only in relation to Congress.74 One
may argue that he referred to the right of petition, rather than to other
provisions embodied in the Bill of Rights, because of the drama
associated with Samuel Hoar, which remained on the minds of those
who understood the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Several
authors have noted that Miller’s reference to the right of petition is
consistent with broader arguments for incorporation.76 On balance,
Professor David Bogen makes a stronger argument that Miller’s
reference to a “right to petition,” although ambiguous, was intended only
to limit state interference with the right to petition the national
government;77 that interpretation became manifest two years later with
Chief Justice Waite’s decision in United States v. Cruikshank.78
A final category of protections identified by Justice Miller was
derived from federal law, and illustrated by reference to both navigation
and treaty rights.79 Again, the use of illustrations that were of central
concern to Samuel Hoar seems more than merely coincidental.80 More
important than the specific context, however, was the embrace of laws
derived from the powers assigned to Congress and the national
government as a source of privileges or immunities.

73. Id.
74. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333,
342 (2003).
75. See William J. Rich, Lessons of Charleston Harbor: The Rise, Fall and Revival of ProSlavery Federalism, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 569, 586 (2005).
76. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000); Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of
Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 750-51; Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1111-15 (2000). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans
Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – or Reveal the Structure
of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 183-84 (1999) (“It was only a series of later decisions that
oddly attributed to Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases the expulsion of
the Bill of Rights from the privileges or immunities cathedral, an expulsion nowhere to be found on
the face of the Miller opinion and indeed inconsistent with much of its language and logic.”).
77. See Bogen, supra note 74, at 376-77 (concluding, after noting the ambiguity in the
Slaughter-House text, that “Miller fully intended to repudiate any theory of incorporation”).
78. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875) (citing Slaughter-House for a distinction between rights of state
and national citizenship).
79. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1873).
80. See Rich, supra note 75, at 606-07.
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Some have questioned the importance of this implied restatement of
federal supremacy.81 Justice Miller downplays the significance of this
third category through his broad description of state police powers,
which he viewed as outside of the ambit of federal privileges or
immunities.82 His relatively limited conception of federal power was
consistent with the understanding of congressional authority in the late
nineteenth century. Since that time, however, dimensions of federal
power have expanded dramatically, as illustrated by contemporary
interpretations of the Commerce Clause.83
Subsequent generations accepted the link that Justice Miller drew
between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Supremacy Clause,
beginning with congressional enactment of what we now know as 42
U.S.C. § 1983.84 Thomas Cooley’s 1880 treatise explained that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected rights to participate in foreign
or domestic commerce, benefits of postal laws, and navigation and travel
rights because “over all of these subjects the jurisdiction of the United
States extends, and they are covered by its laws.”85 A widely recognized
article from 1918 by Professor D. O. McGovney explained that, to
understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause, counsel must simply
ask “what provision or text of Federal law creates or grants this alleged
privilege or immunity.”86 More contemporary commentators reinforced
this understanding, although doing so in disparaging terms, expressing
the lack of any “independent function [of the Privileges or Immunities

81. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 1675 (Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello & Kenneth R. Thomas eds., 2004)
(stating that the Slaughter-House Cases reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to “a
superfluous reiteration of a prohibition already operative against the states”).
82. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-78.
83. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce includes prohibiting local cultivation and use of marijuana); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
prohibiting “loan sharking” activities is within Congress’s power to control activities affecting
interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress had
ample basis upon which to find that racial discrimination at restaurants, which received from out of
state a substantial portion of food served, had a direct and adverse effect on interstate commerce).
84. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
85. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245 (1880).
86. McGovney, supra note 8, at 225. Prof. McGovney’s article was recognized by the
Association of American Law Schools in 1938 as part of a collection of essays considered to have
“permanent value.” SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at v (Ass’n of Am. Law Schools
ed. 1938).
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Clause], except as an alternative to using the Supremacy Clause.”87
Both the history leading up to the Civil War88 and contemporary
experience,89 however, demonstrate the importance of this element of the
framework described by Justice Miller.
IV. CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court got it right when the justices decided in 1999
that the right of new state residents to enjoy the same privileges as those
accorded to long term residents is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.90 Justice Stevens’ opinion
for the Court cites Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion as authority
for that conclusion,91 and by doing so revives the first component of the
constitutional framework derived from that text.
Although the second segment of Justice Miller’s framework could
have been expanded to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights,92
conceptions of sovereignty accepted by Miller, and at least some of his
colleagues,93 constrained that development. The significance of that
loss, however, should not be overstated.94 The Incorporation Doctrine
should now be treated as settled law; contemporary battles over that
issue sustain interesting academic squabbles, but have little likelihood of
changing judicial treatment of the rights of American citizens. Thus,
although the second component of Justice Miller’s framework may not
be linked to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, analogous protection
extends from contemporary due process analysis. While perhaps
unsatisfactory to constitutional purists, this solution meets the needs of
those victimized by state abuse.
87. Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to
Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997).
88. See Rich, supra note 75, at 578-99 (describing actions against black seamen, the Hoar
affair, the nullification crisis, and secession, all representing challenges to national sovereignty).
89. See Rich, supra note 21, at 284-92 (describing Supreme Court decisions barring
individual monetary relief from state violations of federal law).
90. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999) (striking down limits on welfare
assistance granted to new residents based upon their state of origin).
91. Id. at 503.
92. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
93. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-50 (1875) (citing Slaughter-House for
the proposition that national and state governments remained “distinct,” and noting that “[t]he
powers which one possesses, the other does not”). Only Justice Clifford dissented from this
opinion. Id. at 559-69.
94. See Bogen, supra note 74, at 392-93 (concluding that the recognition of substantive due
process and incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause protects
fundamental rights and remains consistent with the framers’ intent).
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It is the third component of the Slaughter-House framework which
appears to have been lost in the shadow of recent ideological battles
within the Supreme Court. In a series of opinions, five Supreme Court
justices decided that rights derived from federal law stemming from
congressional exercise of its power pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution are constrained by the Eleventh Amendment.95 Those
justices substitute their own conventional wisdom for the actual text and
history of the Eleventh Amendment and for the conceptions of
sovereignty existing at the time the Eleventh Amendment was
promulgated.96 They concede the fact that the Due Process and Equal
Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment override the
Eleventh Amendment,97 but then circumscribe congressional authority to
interpret those clauses. To date, they have totally ignored the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.98
The result of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment is a
fundamentally incoherent conception of federalism generally, and of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular. The Supreme Court
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is at odds with conceptions of
sovereignty that gave rise to the language in that text.99 In more
particular terms, the justices acknowledge that language in 42 U.S.C. §

95. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (barring private
parties from bringing complaints against state agencies to the Federal Maritime Commission); Bd.
of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred private enforcement of the Americans With Disabilities Act against states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding Congress could not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
when it authorized private enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states are immune from enforcement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in state court); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that patent rights could not be enforced against states); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that the Commerce Clause did not give
Congress authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment).
96. See Rich, supra note 75, at 575-77 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment incorporated a
conception of separate state and federal sovereignty, and that contemporary conceptions of state
sovereign immunity in the context of legitimate federal power may be traced to nineteenth century
states’ rights advocacy aimed at preserving slavery).
97. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (quoting
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
98. See id. at 374 (concluding that the scope of the Equal Protection Clause did not
encompass rights protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act).
99. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that “numerous scholars have exhaustively and conclusively refuted the contention that the
Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of sovereign immunity to the States”).
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1983 provides for enforcement of federal statutes,100 but have never
addressed the relationship between § 1983’s language and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.101 By ignoring this relationship, the Court is left
with untenable conclusions, such as the decision that states may freely
violate federal patent law with impunity.102 Bankruptcy law has become
similarly twisted in order to avoid the unworkable implication that states
are immune from judgments deriving their authority from federal
statutes.103
Why is this so important? In a broader context, scholars categorize
rights in both “negative” and “positive” terms.104 Negative rights
impose constraints on government, and, to the regret of some,105 the Bill
of Rights, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause have
all been limited to that category.106 Those who believe in the importance
of positive rights,107 however, may see the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a repository of such rights.108 By their nature, positive rights
lend themselves to legislative control, and, properly understood, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause recognizes such congressional action.109
Authority to establish positive rights that states must adhere to or face
100. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1989)
(accepting the National Labor Relations Act as an example of “rights, privileges or immunities”
protected by § 1983).
101. See Rich, supra note 21, at 298. As noted by David Bogen, this argument may not be
persuasive to those current justices who refuse to acknowledge that the original grant of federal
power in Article I of the Constitution was limited by the principle of state sovereignty. See Bogen,
supra note 74, at 362-63. For those justices who have consistently objected to decisions
constraining congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, however, this argument
stands as further support for their dissenting opinions.
102. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (concluding that the Patent Clause could not be relied upon to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment).
103. See Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (concluding, by a
5-4 vote, that states are not immune from bankruptcy court orders).
104. See Rich, supra note 23, at 210-11.
105. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 105-51 (1994).
106. See Rich, supra note 23, at 211.
107. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 111-61 (2000) (arguing that the state in a good society must ensure fundamental human
capabilities); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 124-28 (1996) (arguing that states must ensure some minimal level of basic goods);
WEST, supra note 105.
108. See Rich, supra note 23, at 210-19.
109. It should be understood that this reference to “positive rights” is limited to rights
identified by Congress and consistent with Article I limits on congressional power. Furthermore,
the only additional authority flowing from the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the power to stop
state abridgement of these rights.
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consequential damages should follow from contemporary recognition of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.110
In practical terms, this means that Congress should have authority
to protect state workers from age discrimination or from discrimination
based upon disabilities by abrogating state immunity from such
actions.111 It also means that the door should be reopened for
enforcement of fair labor standards against state employers,112 and calls
for elimination of the unworkable proposition that Congress lacks power
to provide for enforcement of patent rights against state governments.113
All responsibilities assigned to Congress under Article I of the
Constitution should once again include the power to ensure state
compliance with federal law.114
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the question of what the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment could have been thinking when they chose the phrase
“privileges or immunities,”115 a transparent purpose emerges. They
cared about incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but that was only one
element of their quest. They cared about rights derived from the
national character of the government, and assuring supremacy of
statutory rights also had major significance at that point in history.

110. Ironically, the Slaughter-House Cases have been blamed for leading the courts down a
path towards exclusive recognition of “negative” (rather than “positive”) rights. See Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409-13 (1990). Adding to the irony, one element of the
critique of negative rights is that it places undue emphasis upon private property rights to the
exclusion of rights of personal well being. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs
and the Bill of “Rights”: A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 457 (1992). As
explained above, Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion was most notable at the time it was
issued for its rejection of claims to extensive private property rights. See supra notes 57-67 and
accompanying text.
111. Reversing conclusions reached by the United States Supreme Court include Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (blocking right to recover monetary damages for violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act) and Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (barring monetary damages against states for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
112. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the principle of state sovereign
immunity limited enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act in both state and federal courts).
113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
114. This conclusion restores the plurality conclusion reached by the Supreme Court when it
addressed the question of congressional power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
115. This phrase was used instead of a more easily defined alternative for the Fourteenth
Amendment’s source of substantive rights.
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“Privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” embraced all
of these sources of law. This conclusion is consistent with Congressman
Bingham’s assurance at the time that the central purpose of this
provision was simply to “bear true allegiance to the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”116 It is also consistent with Justice Miller’s
understanding that “privileges” and “immunities” include “nearly every
civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized
government is instituted,”117 but only those aspects that fall within the
scope of federal authority are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.118
It is time to breathe new life into the historical narrative that
accompanies our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. To do so
requires reconsideration of Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion and
resuscitation of the missing piece of the framework established by that
opinion. Restoration of federal statutory rights will result.

116. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873).
118. Id. at 78.
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